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Foreword
Statements of Tax Policy represent a conscientious effort by
the federal tax division of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants to explore, comment, and, where appropriate,
develop positions on matters of tax policy covering major areas
of taxation in which members of the accounting profession have
special competence.
The present system of taxing corporate-source income has often
been criticized as being a negative factor in the accumulation of
capital which makes up an essential element in the economic
growth of the United States. This negative influence becomes
even more apparent when the system is compared to the tax poli
cies administered in other nations. It is intended that the formal
presentation of this study will assist members of the congressional
tax writing committees, members of the executive branch of
government, and the public in their consideration of this subject.
Statements of Tax Policy are approved by the executive com
mittee of the federal tax division after they are developed by the
division’s tax policy subcommittee. Other division subcommittees
may develop a policy statement if requested to do so. This state
ment was approved by the 1974-75 tax policy subcommittee and
the 1975-76 executive committee.
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Eli Gerver, CPA
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James E. Wheeler, CPA
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Special recognition for the development of this statement must
be accorded the task force which was appointed for this project.
The members of that task force, which was chaired by William
H. Hoffman, CPA, included Leonard A. Rapoport, CPA, and
John R. Herzfeld, CPA. These gentlemen were ably assisted in
their research and writing by David W. LaRue, graduate tax re
search fellow at the University of Houston.

J oel M. F orster, D irector

F ed eral Tax Division

Summary of Recommendations
The Institute believes that the present tax treatment of corpo
rate-source income does not measure up to accepted standards of
tax equity, and that such treatment inhibits the growth and
development of not only the corporate sector but all phases of
the U.S. economy. Furthermore, the double-taxation of corporatesource income has added to the complexity of tax law administra
tion.1 And finally, since the in ciden ce of the corporate income tax
is unknown, the present system has hindered the Congress’s
ability to predict the effect of proposed legislation and to thereby
design the legislation that most accurately and effectively ac
complishes its social and economic purposes. We believe that some
measure of integration of the corporate and individual income
taxes would alleviate these problem areas.
Based on our analysis of the various alternatives considered,
we urge the adoption of either a dividends-paid deduction for
corporations or a “gross-up” method of calculation that would
allow a tax credit to shareholders for those taxes paid by the cor-

1 For example, the whole purpose of the collapsible corporation provisions
of IRC Sec. 341 is to preclude the avoidance of the corporate income tax
(with attendant recognition by the shareholders of stock appreciation at
preferential long-term capital gain rates). Needless to say, IRC Sec. 341
has to be one of the most complex provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code.
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poration which are attributable to the income distributed as
dividends. Properly structured, either alternative would be feas
ible from an administrative standpoint and would correct many
of the shortcomings of the current system of taxing corporatesource income.

Review of the Current System
Under present U.S. law, corporate-source income is subject to
a two-tier system of taxation.2 Income is taxed first when it is
earned by a corporation and again upon its distribution to share
holders as dividends representing “current and accumulated earn
ings and profits.” The issues to be considered here are whether
such a system impairs the achievement of tax equity among
various categories of taxpayers and to what extent the taxing
system introduces distortions into the economy which inhibit
domestic capital expansion and growth as well as competitive
effectiveness in world markets.
Following are some of the major concerns that prompt recon
sideration of the present system of taxing corporate-source in
come.
L a c k o f H orizontal Equity. A system lacks horizontal equity
when it maintains different income tax rates between share
holders and other taxpayers. Since corporate earnings are subject
to double taxation, the shareholder of a corporation does not
effectively receive the same tax treatment accorded to the partner
of a partnership or to the sole proprietor of a proprietorship. The
same disparity exists when the tax treatment of corporate-source
income is compared with that accorded to other classes of income
such as wages, salaries, and interest. As a result of the imposition
of such non-neutral corporate income taxes, otherwise econom
ically sound business and investment decisions are distorted, re-

2 See Appendix 1 for a brief review of the history of taxation of corporatesource income in the United States.
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suiting in a reduction in the overall efficiency of the market
system in the United States.3
V ertical Equity Is Not A chieved. Vertical equity refers to the
tax burdens levied on persons at different income levels, presum
ably to reflect societal views on ability to pay.4 Corporate-source
income may be taxed more heavily at the low-income shareholder
level than at the high-income level.5 Compare, for example, the
effective tax rate imposed on dividend income received by a
shareholder in the 20 percent tax bracket with that imposed on a
70 percent tax bracket shareholder. Presuming a 48 percent cor
porate tax bracket, the corporation pays ea ch o f th ese shareholders
$520 out of earnings on which it has already paid $480 in corpo
rate taxes. The 20 percent tax bracket shareholder pays an addi
tional $104 of income taxes. This results in an effective tax rate
of 58 percent on the dividend income. (Corporate taxes of $480
plus individual taxes of $104, divided by before-tax earnings out
of which the dividend was paid ($1000).) This represents a 192
percent increase, (that is, 58 percent/20 percent) in the share
holder’s effective tax rate. The 70 percent tax bracket shareholder
pays an additional $364 on his dividends or an effective rate of
84 percent. The increase in his effective tax rate, however, is only
20 percent, as opposed to 192 percent for the 20 percent bracket
shareholder.6 The tables on page 5 illustrate the regressive nature
3 See Charles E. McClure, “The Case of Integrating the Income Taxes,”
National Tax Journal, September 1975, pp. 257-64.
4 McClure, “Integrating the Income Taxes,” p. 257.
5 As a matter of initial reaction, one might conclude that the observation
overstates the problem since the number of low-income shareholders is
probably less than those with high incomes. But what about those individ
uals with low or modest incomes who hold stock indirectly through in
terests in pension and profit-sharing plans? Needless to say the future
value of any such rights has to be affected by the tax treatment presently
accorded to corporate-source income. Furthermore, those tax-exempt or
ganizations which benefit lower-income groups derive substantial income
through ownership of corporate stock. Thus, vertical equity again suffers
when corporate-source income is taxed at the corporate level.
6 This illustration does not take into account either the $25,000 corporate
surtax exemption or the $100 exclusion applicable to the shareholder’s an
nual dividend income.
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of taxing corporate-source income. The effect of the indirect
corporate income tax conflicts with the socioeconomic principle
that the tax burden should be at least mildly progressive and
certainly not regressive.
M isallocation B etw een C orporate and N on-C orporate Sectors.
Capital can be considered to be misallocated between the corpo
rate and non-corporate sectors of the economy. Taxing corporate
profits tends to increase the cost of capital to the corporate sector
as investors seek to equalize the after-tax rate of return on cor
porate and non-corporate capital. Consequently, capital (invest
ment) will shift from the corporate to the non-corporate sector
and the cost of capital in the corporate sector will rise. The
before-tax rate of return will be higher in the corporate sector
than in the non-corporate sector, once the after-tax rates are
equalized by the reallocation of capital. This difference results in
misallocation of capital since before-tax rates of return reflect the
relative productivity of capital in various industries (e.g., capital
is over supplied to the low-tax industries.)7 As mentioned previ
ously, the ultimate result is that many situations will be taxinduced distortions of economic decisions.
N egative Im p act on C apital Accumulation. It can be argued
that the present system of taxing corporate-source income has had
7 See A. C. Harberger, “The Corporation Income Tax: An Empirical Ap
praisal,” in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Tax
Revision Compendium, vol. 1, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, pp. 231-50;
and A. C. Harberger, “Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income From Cap
ital” in Effects of the Corporation Income Tax, ed. Marian Krzyzaniak
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1966). A recent analysis by
John B. Shoven, “The Incidence and Efficiency Effects of Taxes on In
come From Capital,” Technical Report No. 173 of the Institute for
Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences (Stanford: Stanford Universi
ty Press, July 1975), updated Harberger’s earlier estimates for the period
of 1953-1959 and estimated the loss in income from the larger taxation of
corporate income to be near $1.5 billion. On this basis one can estimate
that for 1974 this figure would be near $5.0 billion. If we assume a 15
percent rate of return on capital, the loss would have to be made up by
an increase in the capital stock of $33 billion. This amount is equal to
about 15 percent of total gross domestic investment in 1974.
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a negative impact on capital accumulation and economic growth
in the United States.8 First, since a relatively large fraction of
property income is saved, the present system of double taxation
has a disproportionately large impact on the overall saving rate
(that is, smaller amounts are available for saving than would
otherwise be the case). Second, to the extent that heavy taxation
of corporate income lowers rates of return, the incentives to save
are likely to be further inhibited. Finally, the corporate tax may
have a separate effect on the incentive to invest.9 If corporations
have a “target” after-tax rate of return which is necessary to com
pensate them for the risks inherent in business investments, the
corporate tax induces firms to forego marginal investments there
by restricting capital accumulation and raising the necessary pre

8 From 1869 to 1929 gross private domestic investment ranged from 20.6
percent to 25.1 percent of gross national product based on decade aver
ages. See Simon Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy: Its Forma
tion and Financing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 6 1 ), p. 93.
Since 1952, U.S. gross private domestic investment as a share of gross na
tional product has been significantly lower, averaging only 15 percent.
This rate of investment is lower than rates in all other developed Western
economies with the possible exception of the United Kingdom, and it is
only half the rate in such economies as Japan and the Soviet Union. See
Edward F . Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ: Postwar Experiences in
Nine Western Countries (Washington, D .C .: Brookings Institution, 1967),
p. 118. The present corporate tax system may well be a significant con
tributor to the U.S.’s relatively low level of capital accumulation. See
Frederick W. Hickman, “Tax Equity and the Need for Capital,” National
Tax Journal, September 1975, pp. 282-91, for an excellent discussion of
the reasons for this problem. See also Reginald H. Jones, “The Need for
Capital,” National Tax Journal, September 1975, pp. 265-81. The pre
cipitous drop in the saving rate and the corresponding decline in the
ratio of corporate stock of plant and equipment to output both occurred
contemporaneously with the substantial increase in corporate tax rates. See
Thomas H. Mayor, “The Decline in the United States Capital-Output
Ratio,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, July 1968, pp.
495-516.
9 Recent empirical work on the determinants of investment indicate that
increases in profits taxes do indeed retard investment unless offset by
other factors. See, for example, Dale W. Jorgenson, “Economic Studies
of Investment Behavior: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature,
December 1971, pp. 1111-47 and Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson,
“Tax Policy and Investment Behavior: Reply and Further Results,” Amer
ican Economic Review, June 1969, pp. 388-401.
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tax return on investment projects. Since after-tax returns (but
not pre-tax returns) have been relatively constant before and
after the imposition of the corporate tax, this hypothesis appears
consistent with the evidence.10 A significant proposition claims
that lower capital accumulation leads to lower levels of plant and
equipment per employed worker and hence to lower wages.
Studies indicate that the negative long-run effects of reduced
capital accumulation are not limited solely to the owners of cor
porate capital.11
D anger o f W eak en ed U.S. M arket Position, Since many other
developed countries have adopted some form of partial integra
tion of corporate and individual income taxes, the argument can
be made that the U.S. system impairs our competitive position in
world markets.12 See Appendix 2, page 30.
1 William Fellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity (New York:
0See
Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1956), pp. 200-3.
1See, for example, Marian Krzyzaniak, “Effects of Profits Taxes; Deduced
From Neoclassical Growth Models” in Effects of Corporation Income Tax,
ed. Marian Krzyzaniak (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1966).
For further discussion, see Hickman, “Tax Equity and the Need for Cap
ital,” National Tax Journal.
12Integration also could serve as a means of competing for foreign capital.
If the primary competitors of the United States introduce integration
and/or dividend credits and extend it to nonresidents in order to attract
investment, the United States will be at a disadvantage in attracting cap
ital. Not only have capital markets become increasingly more interrelated
in recent years but the United States unquestionably is now more de
pendent on such markets. Other countries have been growing quicker and
have been generating a larger share of world savings. Also, the increases
in oil prices have transferred a great deal of wealth to Oil and Petroleum
Exporting Countries (O PEC) nations. As this wealth will be invested
throughout the industrial world, it can be argued that tax-rate differentials
no longer are irrelevant for the growth and long-run success of the United
States in world markets. However, the benefits of lower tax rates on cor
porate equity if also extended to foreigners have to be weighed against
tax losses. The loss of revenues from profits accrued to residents can be re
captured by other taxes but for foreign residents this may not be possible.
Some forms of integration therefore might represent a net withdrawal of
resources out of the United States (that is, the additional capital inflow
would not be sufficient to offset the loss in tax revenue on foreign resi
dents). See Richard M. Bird, “International Aspects of Integration,” Na
tional Tax Journal, September 1975, pp. 302-14.
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Interest Is D edu ctible and D ividends Are Not. The tax-induced
incentive for debt financing over equity financing is quite appar
ent. Heavy reliance on debt financing, however, results in fixed
interest commitments that aggravate the financial distress of many
corporations—especially during periods of recession.13
R etention o f Earnings at C orporate L evel. The present tax
system encourages retention of earnings at the corporate level,
particularly for smaller corporations. To avoid the tax imposed on
dividend income, shareholders in control of corporate policy are
motivated to retain corporate earnings at the corporate level and
to eventually convert the stock appreciation attributable to such
retention into preferential long-term capital g a i n s . 14If the stock
is held until death, any such appreciation will escape the income
tax entirely by virtue of basis adjustments provided for in IRC
Sec. 1014. Thus, encouraged by the operation of the present tax
system, substantial amounts of funds are “locked-in” at the corpo
rate level. Whether such accumulations are desirable from an
economic standpoint, of course, depends upon how they are used
by the corporation.15 The penalty tax (IR C Sec. 531) imposed on
An interesting explanation of why corporations have not turned towards
debt financing more often can be found in Joseph Stiglitz, “Taxation, Cor
poration Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital,” The Journal of Public
Economics, February 1973, pp. 1-34. In substance the rationale is that
the double tax effect of the present system is partially avoided by with
holding dividend distribution with the expectation that corporate growth
will be recognized by the shareholders in the form of preferentially
treated long-term capital gains upon a taxable disposition of their stock
investment.
A few economists have suggested that integration of the corporate and
individual income taxes is the most appropriate means for tightening the
taxation of capital gains ordinarily attributable to the retention of earnings
at the corporate level. See George Break, “Integrating Corporate and
Personal Income Taxes: The Carter Commission Proposals,” Law and
Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1969, pp. 726-35; and Holland, “Stock
holder Differential Taxation and Tax Relief,” in U.S. Congress, House,
Committee on Ways and Means, Tax Revision Compendium, vol. 3, 86th
Cong. 1st sess., 1959, pp. 1551, 1571-74.
There are, however, two more somewhat minor points, which represent
further criticism of the present system. First, the tax incentives to retain
earnings will distort the allocation of capital within the corporation.
Mature firms with high rates of profits will retain and reinvest too much
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earnings accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the busi
ness, however, is designed to insure that earnings retained by
the corporation are motivated by economic, rather than tax
avoidance, objectives.
Tax A voidance. The present system of double taxation has
propagated countless tax avoidance schemes and has generated
many complexities in the Internal Revenue Code designed to
combat them. If, for example, double taxation is to be avoided
at the corporate level, profits must be distributed in some form
other than that of dividends. The choice of “interest” may cause
a “thin” corporation problem (IR C Sec. 385), while using “sala
ries” could raise the unreasonable compensation issue (IR C Sec.
162(a) ( 1 ) ) . On the other hand, if the double tax on corporatesource income is avoided at the shareholder level, withholding
dividend distributions may bring into play the penalty tax on un
reasonable accumulations of earnings (IR C Secs. 531-537) or, in
more limited situations, the personal holding company tax (IR C
Secs. 541-547). Needless to say, these complexities add to the
administrative burden imposed on the IRS and to the cost of tax
payer compliance. Nor do they establish that type of climate all
parties need and deserve to carry on their affairs with tax cer
tainty.
U ncertainties o f the System. One of the primary drawbacks of
the present system is uncertainty about the possible impact of
governmental tax policy on the distribution of income and on
economic efficiency. While a given amount of tax revenue raised
of their after-tax income since they recognize that stockholders prefer
capital gains relative to dividends. Unless firms are quick to diversify, to
expand their product lines, or to merge, new high-yielding ventures will
be ignored while retained earnings will be invested in lower-yielding in
vestments. The corporate income tax when couched with the preferred
treatment of capital gains may act as major impediments to the formation
of new firms and encourages economic concentration.
Second, the present system will segment the capital market into firms
that tend to cater to high-income capital gains-oriented investors and those
which will tend to pay out a larger proportion of their dividends to in
vestors who are in lower tax brackets. This segmentation hampers diversi
fication of portfolios of individual investors and complicates the invest
ment and dividend pay-out decisions of corporate managers.
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via income taxes on individuals has relatively predictable impli
cations for income distribution and economic efficiency, the same
amount of revenue raised via a corporate income tax carries rela
tively uncertain implications. This uncertainty is attributable both
to a lack of knowledge about who owns the stock, and thus who
is affected by the corporate tax, and to the possibility that part or
all of the burden of the tax is being shifted to nonshareholders.16
Much of this uncertainty could be eliminated by integrating the
two taxes, since improved information about the impact of pro
posed tax policy fosters better tax legislation. Thus, an important
argument exists in favor of integration.

Alternatives Considered
Given that the present system of double taxation of corporatesource income is not satisfactory, what alternatives are available?
Can a system of complete or partial integration of the corporate
and individual income taxes be found which will achieve the ob
jectives of tax equity and neutrality? To determine this, the In
stitute has reviewed six possible alternatives:
The Partnership Approach
Repeal of the Corporate Income Tax
Expansion of the Dividends-Received Exclusion
Institution of a Dividends-Received Credit
Provision for a Dividends-Paid Deduction at the Corporate
Level
The “Gross-Up” Method
Although the ultimate recommendations of the Institute favor
the dividends-paid deduction or the gross-up method, each al
ternative should be explored in order to provide a stronger basis
for analysis and comparison.
It should be noted that the Institute is aware of the recom
1 shown by Joseph A. Pechman and Benjamin A. Okner, Who Bears the
6As
Tax Burden? (Washington, D .C .: Brookings Institution, 1974), the im
pact of the corporate tax on income distribution and efficiency is highly
sensitive to the possibility of a tax shift.
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mendations for integration proposed by the Honorable William
E. Simon, secretary of the Treasury, before the House Ways and
Means Committee on July 31, 1975. Referred to as the “half-andhalf method” in his report, the proposal envisions a combination
of our dividends-paid deduction alternative and the gross-up
method. We favor the adoption of either alternative; but, any
compromise between the two may solve the integration problem.
It should be noted, however, that the half-and-half method is
more complex than either the dividends-paid deduction method
or the gross-up method. Thus, more difficult compliance and ad
ministration problems could be expected with this form of inte
gration.17 Although the half-and-half method is not discussed as a
separate alternative, its effect is shown in Tables 1 and 2 of
Appendix 3.
Assumptions Underlying the Alternatives. The analysis and
recommendations set forth below are predicated on the following
assumptions:
• If the corporate income tax is retained, the rate structure as
presently constituted will not change. Although the recommenda
tions made here could be simplified if the corporate income tax
were a flat rate (for example, 50 percent of taxable income),
elimination of the surtax exemption would not be politically
feasible and would work a hardship on small and less profitable
concerns.
• Revenue loss estimates resulting from the various alternatives
are based upon information obtained from the Department of the
Treasury.

The Partnership Approach
The corporate form would be disregarded for tax purposes, if
it is presumed that a corporation, like a partnership, is in reality
a conduit for its owners. Thus, this approach would eliminate the
1
7The
Institute agrees with the secretary’s recommendation that the bene
fits of integration not be extended to shareholders who are tax-exempt
organizations, but has taken no position as to the tax treatment of foreign
shareholders.
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corporate income tax, with all corporate-source income being
taxed at the shareholder level at an applicable marginal rate.
Complete integration would result, with no distortion of vertical
or horizontal tax equity. If corporate-source income were treated
like any other income from capital, tax-induced investment de
terrents in the corporate sector would be eliminated, and tax
neutrality as to the choice of business organization could be
achieved.
D isadvantages. Although a conceptually perfect alternative to
the present tax system, the partnership approach seems almost
impossible to implement. Some illustrations of the administrative
problems that would be encountered in such a system follow.
• At the corporate level exact records would have to be maintained
for every shareholder, regardless of how long the stock was
owned.
• Intercorporate holdings would cause a time lag in the determi
nation of the pass-through to the shareholder level unless corpo
rations owning stock in other corporations were required to accrue
their share of the income earned by the owned corporations.18
• Different classes of stock would further complicate the pass
through allocation. If, for example, a corporation had both com
mon and preferred stock outstanding, in any one year the excess
of earnings attributable to the preferred stock would be allocated
to the common shareholders. If the excess were not distributed
but, instead, accumulated at the corporate level, it would still be
taxed to the common shareholders. What if the excess was distrib
uted to the preferred shareholders in a later year?19
• If partnership treatment is to be carried out in full, the identity
of corporate-source income (for example, interest on state and
local bonds, capital gains, and so forth) and certain deductions
and losses (for example, charitable contribution deductions, cap
ital losses, and so forth) would have to be preserved. Conse
1 the discussion in Charles E. McClure, Jr., “Integration of the Personal
8See
and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Re
form Proposals,” Harvard Law Review, January 1975, p. 563.
19This sort of problem is avoided in Subchapter S corporations by the one
class of stock requirement of IRC Sec. 1371 (a) (4 ).
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quently,the pass-through allocation would be further complicated.
• At the shareholder level, constant adjustment in the basis of
the stock investment ( for example, increases for pro rata shares of
undistributed corporate profits) would impose a serious record
keeping burden on all concerned.
• The partnership approach suffers from the real possibility that
shareholders may be taxed on corporate income not received
(that is, the “wherewithal-to-pay problem”). Although this prob
lem exists with respect to the partnership form, partners generally
have more control over fund withdrawals than the minority share
holders of a large corporation.
A similar approach can, of course, be found in the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 under the provisions of Subchapter S. One
might note, however, that the election is limited to corporations
having no more than ten shareholders and possessing only one
class of stock. W ith this precedent as a starting point, the partner
ship approach might accommodate an even greater number of cor
porations—but again with marked limitations due to the problems
of administration. Surely, were Subchapter S to be used to carry
out this lim ited change, it should be amended to conform more
closely to the tax treatment presently in effect for partnerships
under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code.

Repeal of the Corporate Income Tax
Unlike the partnership approach, which would also eliminate
the corporate income tax, repeal of the corporate income tax
would continue taxing corporate-source income to shareholders,
but only as it is distributed. Such an alternative would place a pre
mium on corporate accumulations—which could be good or bad,
depending on how these funds are utilized by the corporation.
Naturally, the incentive to accumulate would be more of a prob
lem with closely held corporations where control is lodged in
the hands of those shareholders in higher marginal individual
income tax brackets who would wish to use the corporate form as
a tax deferral device.
Though repeal of the corporate income tax would eliminate the
double tax on dividend distributions, it could lead to a lessening
13

of the progressivity of the tax system. “Locked-in” earnings at the
corporate level could be converted by a shareholder into prefer
ential long-term capital gains upon a taxable sale or exchange of
the stock.
Because of the tax avoidance potential at the shareholder level,
the elimination of the corporate income tax would require other
changes in the Internal Revenue Code. One change would be to
treat any gain from the sale of a corporate stock investment as
ordinary income. This could cause undue hardship ( in terms of a
“bunching” effect) on a taxpayer that realizes appreciation at
tributable to many years of corporate growth. Provision would
have to be made, in the interest of equity, for the annual accruals
of increases in stock values. Besides violating the wherewithalto-pay concept and the notion, present throughout the Internal
Revenue Code, that gains should only be recognized as actually
realized through some sort of a sale or exchange, the practical
difficulty of periodically determining changes in stock value
should be apparent to all. However, the bunching of income in
the year of sale might be alleviated through some sort of averag
ing device.

Expansion of the Dividends-Received Exclusion
An expansion of the dividends-received exclusion, if a full ex
clusion were allowed, would eliminate the double tax treatment of
corporate-source income. But instead of approaching the problem
from the standpoint of the corporation (that is, eliminating the
corporate income tax), the solution concentrates on the share
holder’s tax consequences. Stated simply, a shareholder would
be allowed to exclude from gross income all qualified dividends
received from domestic corporations. This alternative would not
be novel in our present tax system, as is evidenced by the $100
exclusion currently provided for by IRC Section 116.
D isadvantages. An expansion of the dividends-received exclu
sion, even on a limited basis, would have the following major
drawbacks.•
• It would not entirely resolve the debt-versus-equity problem.
Corporations might still be inclined to favor debt financing over
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equity issues because interest payments would continue to be
deductible while dividend distributions would not. Of course, it is
reasonable to anticipate that the distortion between debt and
equity financing currently existing would not be as pronounced
because of investor pressures favoring equity investments and
their nontaxable dividend distributions.
• The lack of vertical equity, inherent in the present system,
would continue in an aggravated form. All shareholders, regard
less of their marginal tax brackets, would be indirectly subject to
a 48 percent tax. This would be true whether or not dividends
were paid by the corporation since the corporate income tax
would remain in effect. Thus a partial or complete dividend ex
clusion would have a regressive effect on taxation of individual
shareholders. The exclusion would favor those in higher tax
brackets, since tax relief would vary in accordance with a share
holder’s marginal tax rate.
Although they would be less pronounced than under the pres
ent system, horizontal inconsistencies would persist. The dispar
ity between the tax rates imposed on shareholders and those im
posed on other taxpayers ( partners, sole proprietors, and so forth)
is not eliminated under this integration alternative.
• An exclusion at the shareholder level provides no relief for re
tained corporate-source income.

Institution of a Dividends-Received Credit
IRC Section 34, effective for certain dividends received in tax
able years ending after July 31, 1954, provided for a 4 percent
credit limited to the shareholder-recipient’s taxable income. With
a phase-out reduction in the percentage allowed as a credit, IRC
Sec. 34 was repealed for dividends received after December 31,
1964. Thus, the dividends-received credit alternative is not a new
or untried approach to achieving partial integration of corporate
and individual income taxes.
D isadvantages. Although less objectionable from a conceptual
standpoint than the dividends-received exclusion, it carries the
same major drawbacks (see the discussion in the prior section).
Additionally, it would obviously favor high-bracket shareholders,
which was the principal justification for the repeal of the 4 percent
15

version (IR C Sec. 34) in 1964. Tax inequity would further ma
terialize if the credit (as was true with IRC Sec. 34) is limited to
taxable income, since this would preclude some shareholders from
taking advantage of part or all of the amount otherwise available.
This last objection could be negated by allowing the full credit,
irrespective of any limitations, even in cases where the share
holder may be entitled to a refund. Alternatively, a system of
carryovers could be utilized.

The Dividends-Paid Deduction
Allowing a corporation to claim a deduction for dividends paid
to its shareholders would achieve integration but would require
corollary modifications in the present tax system.
Adoption of a dividends-paid deduction should carry with it
the repeal of IR C Section 243 and related provisions dealing with
the dividends-received deduction (85 percent in most cases) al
lowed to corporate distributees.
Attendant with the repeal of the dividends-received deduction,
there appears to be no reason why the tax treatment of property
distributions to corporate distributees ( IRC Section 301 ( b ) ( 1 )
( B ) and related provisions) cannot be simplified. Since a step-up
in basis can no longer be achieved by only a 15 percent inclusion
in gross income, why not treat corporate and individual distribu
tees equally? Thus, the fair market value of the property would
be the measure of the dividend income, and such value would be
come its basis in the hands of the distributee shareholder—wheth
er individual or corporate. The deduction of the distributing cor
poration should be limited to the corporation’s adjusted basis in
the property distributed.
The Institute believes that the dividends-paid deduction should
be denied with respect to dividends distributed to tax-exempt
organizations.
The tax effect on the corporation and shareholders is illustrated
in Tables 1 and 2 contained in Appendix 3.
A dvantages
• Corporate-source income that is distributed to shareholders
would be taxed equitably—both from a horizontal and vertical
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standpoint. The tax disparity between debt and equity financing
would be considerably eased. Since dividends paid would become
deductible, one important reason for choosing the debt route dis
appears. As dividends become deductible, equity financing be
comes more attractive both to corporate management and to
potential investors. By shifting to an equity source of funds,
corporations can avoid the potentially hazardous commitment
that accompanies debt obligations. During periods of low or
nonexistent earnings, dividend distributions can be postponed.
Interest and debt repayments must continue, however, if the
business is to survive.
• Making dividend distributions deductible undoubtedly would
increase the flow of funds from corporations to shareholders. With
respect to lower-income shareholders, these additional spendable
funds would lead to increased consumption power.
• Although the dividends-paid deduction has not had wide ap
plication in the United States, it is used with various modifica
tions in other developed countries. For example, the “split-rate”
system in effect in West Germany is a partial deduction for divi
dends paid.20 This does not imply that the United States should
pattern its tax laws after other nations. However, in the inter
national market setting, we must remain sensitive to the possibil
ity that our tax system may place domestic corporations at a
competitive disadvantage.
• The adoption of the dividends-paid deduction alternative would
ease certain tax problems inherent to closely held corporations.
Once both dividends and interest become deductible, the motiva
tion leading toward “thin” capitalization weakens, although it
does not disappear. Shareholders may still wish to withdraw
some of their investment in the corporation without income tax
consequences (that is, by means of the repayment-of-debt prin
cipal ). Perhaps more pronounced will be the resolution of the un
reasonable compensation issue. Except for limited situations where
excessive salaries may be paid in order to qualify a shareholder2
0One
of the reasons why this system was adopted by West Germany was
the hope that it would increase stock ownership by lower and middle
income individuals.
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employee for the maximum tax on earned income (IR C Section
1348), preference for salaries over dividends would be neutral
ized. The same can be said for the current practice of share
holders’ leasing property to a corporation in order to generate a
rental deduction. At the corporate level it does not matter whether
the distribution is characterized as interest, salaries, or rent be
cause all such legitimate expenditures are deductible.
D isadvantages. Several objections can be raised against the
adoption and implementation of the dividends-paid deduction
as a vehicle toward achieving partial integration.
• Complete integration is not achieved within the dividends-paid
deduction alternative as it is in the partnership approach, since
the corporate income tax would continue to apply to undistrib
uted corporate profits. It would seem feasible, however, to par
tially rectify this inequity by allowing some type of carryback
and/or carryforward procedure for dividends paid in excess of
earnings. Thus, a corporation which chose not to make a dividend
distribution in one year and accumulated its profits instead would
be penalized only temporarily. The corporation would be able to
make excessive distributions in later years with carryback relief
against the corporate income tax originally imposed. Obviously,
such a procedure would require certain safeguards to prevent
manipulation directed toward tax avoidance. If a carryback pro
cedure is established, a cut-off date must be set to preclude
dividends in excess of current earnings from leading to the refund
of prior corporate income taxes paid. To illustrate, if the enacting
legislation is approved in 1976, the carryback could be made ap
plicable only to earnings and profits accumulated for tax years
beginning after 1975.
• Another major objection might be that the dividends-paid de
duction will penalize growing firms that need funds for expansion
and development and accord preference to mature firms that do
not. The answer might lie in a consent dividend procedure such
as is currently provided for by IRC Section 565 (relating to the
penalty tax on the unreasonable accumulation of earnings and the
personal holding company tax). Under such a procedure, a share
holder could agree (on a timely basis) to include in gross in
come as a dividend a pro rata share of current undistributed
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corporate profits. As a result, the corporation would be allowed a
dividends-paid deduction even though it retains the amount of
the consent dividend. The shareholders who agreed to the con
sent dividend, in turn, would increase the basis of their stock
investment by the amount taxed but not received. However, the
shareholders would have to use funds from other sources to pay
the tax on the dividend.
• The dividends-paid deduction places a premium on distributions
to shareholders that could conceivably impede economic growth
within the corporate sector. Thus, if corporations maximize the
deduction, what is left for capital spending? ( The answer involves
comments stated above plus a consideration of the vagaries of
the securities markets.) First, presuming the inclusion of an ef
fective carryback/carryover procedure, the dividend distribution
could be postponed with only interim tax consequences. Second,
a consent dividend procedure would permit an immediate tax
benefit to the corporation with the advantage of the retention of
the funds. Third, with the increase in dividend output that the
proposal will generate, further investor interest in equity securi
ties might well be e n c o u ra g e d .21There is, of course, no way to
know whether the inflow of equity funds would match the out
flow of actual dividend distributions.
• Suppose a corporation making a dividend distribution has taxfree and/or preferentially taxed income for the year. Should the
dividends-paid deduction be allowed in full or should it be re
duced by the portion attributable to the nontaxable or prefer
entially taxed income? As long as the deduction did not exceed
the corporations taxable in com e (as determined under present
law) for the year, there should be no need to make any such
adjustment. If the distribution exceeds current taxable income, a
carryback or carryover would be in order.
• Would not the provision for a dividends-paid deduction cause
an immediate and severe revenue loss to the U.S. Treasury? That
2
1One
can reasonably argue that the dividends-paid deduction will enhance
the supply of capital (that is, savings) for corporate investment. Since the
deduction will increase after-tax income of shareholders, their propensity
to save will increase and a large proportion of such savings might return
to the corporate sector in the form of new equity or debt holdings.
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there would be a revenue loss can hardly be doubted.22 But then,
any integration scheme, whether partial or complete, by definition
must carry a similar effect. The only question is the severity of the
loss and what can be done about it.
First, one would expect the deduction to be available only for
the distribution of corporate profits earned after the effective date
of the enacting legislation. Distributions of earnings accumulated
prior to this date would not qualify. It would seem appropriate
that the present source of dividend rules continue to apply where
current earnings and profits would be deemed to have been dis
tributed first. Second, recall that the dividends-paid deduction
alternative does not envision the repeal of the corporate income
tax—it would still apply to undistributed corporate profits. Third,
the immediacy of any substantial losses might be avoided by some
sort of phase-in period. For example, if the deduction is to become
operative in 1976 it could be limited to 20 percent of the divi
dends paid, with progression to 40 percent in 1977, 60 percent in
1978, and so on until 100 percent is reached. Fourth, and perhaps
most important, are the long-range effects of the proposal. If it
is true that the dividends-paid deduction leads to economic stimu
lation and growth, any initial revenue loss might well be com
pensated for once the phase-in effect has passed.
• What effect, if any, would the dividends-paid deduction have
at the state level? In those states imposing an individual income
tax, it is doubtful that the result could be anything but an in2Department of the Treasury estimates based on 1977 revenue levels re
flect that the complete deduction at the corporate level for dividends
paid would generate a loss of approximately $15 billion. Alternatively,
the gross-up method would generate a revenue loss of $19 billion if the
credit were extended to tax-exempt and foreign stockholders, and approx
imately $12.5 billion if not so extended.
The larger revenue loss for the gross-up method results because more
cash is at the shareholder level. This has the same effect as if the total dis
tributions were larger, thus creating a larger revenue loss. Under the
dividends-paid deduction method, it is the corporation which will have
more cash. If it distributed all that additional cash to its shareholders, the
revenue loss would be the same as under the gross-up method (that is,
larger dividends would appear at the shareholder level). Over time, it is
probable that there will be some increase in the level of dividends under
the deduction method and, therefore, a somewhat greater loss than the
$15 billion indicated.
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crease in revenue. Because the prospect of the federal deduction
will stimulate dividend distributions, more income will be subject
to state and local taxes in the hands of recipient shareholders.
Unless states levying corporate income taxes also permit a divi
dends-paid deduction, there should be no offsetting loss from this
source.

The " Gross-Up'' Method
Like the dividends-paid deduction alternative, the gross-up
method depends on retention of the corporate income tax. But in
stead of focusing on the corporation, relief is provided at the
shareholder level. Under this proposal a shareholder includes in
gross income the net dividends received plus the corporate in
come tax attributable to such dividends (that is, the dividends
would be “grossed up”). The shareholder then computes the in
come tax in the regular manner but is permitted to claim as a tax
credit the amount of the gross-up. In effect, the corporate income
tax is withheld by the corporation on behalf of its shareholders
then passed through to them as a credit when dividends are dis
tributed. Several observations, both pro and con, can be made
about this attractive method of partial integration.
In terms of tax equity, the result would parallel that achieved
under the dividends-paid deduction alternative. Thus, vertical and
horizontal tax equity would be achieved for distributed profits
but not for those accumulated.
Under the gross-up method, dividends would become more at
tractive to the investor than interest.23 The taxpayer, in addition

2
3Although
dividend income and interest income are taxed at the same
effective rate under the gross-up method, a dollar’s worth of interest in
come received by the taxpayer is not equivalent to a dollar’s worth of
dividend income. For example, a 30 percent tax bracket taxpayer receives
$156 in dividends on which the distributing corporation has paid $144 in
corporate taxes ($300 X 48 percent rate). Although the taxpayer’s gross
income includes both the $156 dividend and the $144 gross-up, the tax
credit of $144 (which accompanies the dividend income) is $100.80
greater than the $43.20 tax (at the marginal rate) on the gross-up
amount. The economic benefit of the $156 dividend received by the tax
payer is $210 ($1.56—($156 + $144 gross-up X 30 percent) + $144
credit).
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to receiving dividend income, also would receive a tax credit that
would more than off set the additional tax liability attributable to
the inclusion of the grossed-up amount. Thus, since dividend in
come is preferred by the investor over interest income, some
easing of the preference for debt over equity financing would seem
bound to occur. But, because dividends are not deductible to the
corporation, those in control of corporate policy are still apt to
lean toward debt and the accompanying interest deduction. One
might surmise, therefore, that the gross-up method would lessen
disparity between debt and equity investments but not to the ex
tent anticipated under the dividends-paid deduction alternative.
In comparing the gross-up method with the dividends-paid
deduction alternative, one important advantage in favor of the
former is the effect on corporate accumulations. Since the corpo
rate income tax must be paid whether profits are distributed or
not, the incentive to distribute dividends would not be nearly as
c o m p e llin g .24Thus, the gross-up method would be more advanta
geous for new and growth corporations planning little or no divi
dend payout.25
The gross-up method should do much to ease the problem of
accumulations by closely held corporations which are motivated
by the avoidance of tax at the shareholder level ( that is, the matter
dealt with in IRC Secs. 531-537 and 541-547). In other words,
shielding shareholders from dividend income is less apt to occur
if the distributions entitle them to a tax credit.
As has been suggested for the dividends-paid deduction, provi
sion should be made to preclude retroactive application to years
2
4One
might expect, however, a definite improvement in corporate—share
holder relations and communication. Shareholders will certainly apply
pressure on corporate management to account for dividend pay-out po
tential. Along the same vein, it can be anticipated that corporate policy
as to dividend distributions will have a definite impact on investment
decisions.
25A variation of the gross-up method would allow the corporation to allocate
dividends to its shareholders without any accompanying distribution.
Known as the Carter Commission proposal, such a procedure resembles
the consent dividend approach suggested in connection with the divi
dends-paid deduction but with the tax consequences falling at the share
holder level. For an excellent discussion of the Carter proposal see Mc
Clure’s article cited in note 18, pp. 569-74.
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prior to the effective date of the enacting legislation. Thus, corpo
rate taxes paid and attributable to profits accumulated before that
date would not be eligible for gross-up and credit treatment.
Some form of the gross-up method has been adopted by other
developed countries (for example, France, Canada, and The
United Kingdom. See Appendix 2 ).
If the United States denies integrated tax treatment ( except on
a treaty basis) to foreign shareholders, the gross-up method
would be preferable to the dividends-paid deduction alternative.
This is true from a compliance and administration standpoint,
since the corporation, under the gross-up method, would be
spared the burden of having to determine the citizenship status of
each of its shareholders.
One problem posed by the gross-up method arises with respect
to determining the corporate tax attributable to the dividend dis
tribution.26 An exact allocation approach, seemingly the most
equitable in terms of its result, could become very complex if ad
justments are to be made for income from tax-free sources.
In the interest of taxpayers in similar situations, the credit al
lowed for the amount of the gross-up should not be limited to
the shareholder’s tax liability generated by the dividends or by his
overall tax liability. Any other approach would penalize share
holders in low marginal tax brackets. Although certain policy
considerations may dictate otherwise, the gross-up procedure
should not be available to shareholders that are tax-exempt
organizations.27
The withholding alternative could cause some instability at the
shareholder level when determining the final income tax in any
one year. Later modifications of corporate income tax liability,
either by action of the IRS or through other events, might well

2 corporate profits are retained and distributed in later years it would, of
6If
course, be necessary to keep track of the attributable corporate tax. In
terms of the order of distribution, one would anticipate the use of the
LIFO approach where distribution would be deemed paid from most re
cent earnings. This is akin to the present structure where distribution first
originates from current earnings and profits.
27Quite simply, the gross-up method off ers greater flexibility than the divi
dends-paid deduction approach in controlling the tax consequences to taxexempt and foreign shareholders.
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change the gross-up computation of previous distributions. In
such cases, aff ected shareholders may be required to file amended
returns. In this regard, the dividends-paid deduction would create
less difficulty, since only the corporation is aff ected by subsequent
adjustments to prior tax y e a r s . 28(The gross-up alternative is illus
trated in Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix 3.)

2
8The
problem is somewhat similar to the situation under present law when
a shareholder treats a distribution as a return of capital and such distribu
tion later turns out to be covered by adequate earnings and profits.
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APPENDIX 1

History of the Taxation
of Corporate-Source Income
in the United States : 1909 to 1975
Beginning in 1913 with the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment,
the United States has maintained two distinct systems of taxing
corporate-source income. Corporations have been subject to an income
tax on their net earnings, while individual shareholders have been
subject to an income tax on corporate distributions. The taxing statutes
have provided little relief at the individual shareholder level to take
into account the taxes paid by the corporation.

The Corporate Income Tax
The federal government has taxed the income of corporations con
tinuously since the enactment of the Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909. This
first tax was not an income tax as such, but rather an “excise” tax im
posed upon the exercise of the privilege of doing business in the cor
porate capacity. The tax was one percent of net income in excess of
$5,000.
This excise tax on corporate income was superseded in 1913 follow
ing the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment which empowered Con
gress to tax income “from whatever source derived.” In its place was
substituted a bona fide “income” tax on the net earnings of the corpo
ration. Then, as now, the tax was imposed directly upon the corpora
tion under the notion that it is a distinct, judicial person—a taxpaying
entity separate from its shareholders. E xcep t for one brief two-year
period in its 63-year history (1 9 3 6 -1 9 3 8 ), the tax has not discriminated
between earnings retained by the corporation and earnings distributed
to its shareholders.
Federal corporate income tax rates have shown a general upward
trend since their first enactment in 1913. From 1913 to the end of the
first W orld W ar in 1918, rates were gradually increased to 12 percent.
During the 1920s they ranged from 10 to 13.5 percent. Graduated cor
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porate tax rates, first introduced in 1936, ranged from 8 percent to 15
percent and were supplemented by a graduated surtax ranging from
7 percent to 27 percent on undistributed profits. In 1938, the surtax on
undistributed profits was removed, and the graduated rates were lim
ited to corporations with net earnings of $25,000 or less.
Tax rates of 25 percent to 40 percent were imposed throughout
World War II. During those years a special excess profits tax brought
the maximum combined effective tax rate on corporate earnings to 80
percent. Effective rates for the remainder of the decade ranged from
21 percent to 38 percent.
In 1950 the graduated tax rates for corporations with taxable in
comes of $25,000 or less were replaced with a single normal tax rate
applicable to the full amount of taxable income and a surtax applicable
to all taxable income in excess of $25,000. From 1950 to 1953 (the
Korean War period) the normal tax rate was 30 percent and the sur
tax rate was 22 percent. Those were supplemented by a 30 percent
excess profits tax, which expired at the close of 1953. It wasn’t until
the Revenue Act of 1964 that the normal and the surtax rates were
changed. The normal rate was reduced to 22 percent and the surtax
rate was increased to 26 percent, and both rates have continued in
effect since 1965. In 1968 and 1969, however, an additional 10 percent
surcharge was imposed. It was reduced to 2.5 percent in 1970 and
subsequently eliminated altogether. For 1975 only, the normal tax was
20 percent for the first $25,000 and 22 percent for taxable income in
excess of $25,000. The surtax rate continued to be 26 percent but,
again, in 1975 only, the surtax exemption was temporarily increased to
$50,000.
The graph opposite shows the standard rates imposed by the fed
eral government on taxable corporate income over $25,000 between
1909 and 1975 inclusive.* No account was taken of excess profits taxes.

Taxation of Corporate Distributions
Individual shareholders. Prior to 1954, dividend income (that is
distributions out of the “earnings and profits” of a corporation) was
taxable as income to the individual stockholder in the same manner as
any other item of gross income. No effect was given to the fact that
corporate earnings, out of which the dividend was distributed, had
been previously subjected to the corporate income tax. The 1954 Code,
by the enactment of IRC Secs. 34 and 116, introduced two forms of

* The 1975 rate applies to income in excess of $50,000.
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limited relief from this “double taxation” of corporate profits. Those
provisions represented the nation’s first attem pt at “integration” of the
corporate and individual income taxes, and their expressed purpose
was to halt the trend tow ard debt financing and to encourage invest
ment in the equity capital of corporations.
As introduced in 1954, the integration scheme had two components—
a limited exclusion from gross income and a limited credit against tax.
The exclusion provision (Sec. 116) perm itted an individual to exclude
from his gross income the first $50 of dividends received during the
taxable year. This provision applied to the dividend income received
by each taxpayer. A husband and wife were each entitled an exclusion
of up to $50 if they both had dividend income, whether filing jointly
or separately.

S o u r c e : “Income Taxes Around the World,” Monthly Economic Letter, (First
National City Bank) May 1968, p. 58. Reprinted with permission.
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The credit provision (IR C Sec. 3 4 ) , on the other hand, let an indi
vidual taxpayer reduce his gross income tax liability by an amount
equal to 4 percent of all the dividends received from domestic corpo
rations which had been included in his or her gross income (th a t is,
the credit was computed on the amount of dividend income net of the
amount of the dividend exclusion). However, the credit reduction in
tax liability could not exceed 4 percent of taxable income, and in no
event could it exceed his income tax liability for that year. Thus, there
was no carryover or carryback of any excess credit, nor was the tax
payer entitled to any refund due to excess credit. Unlike the exclusion
( computed on the basis of separate ownership), the credit for married
taxpayers was computed on the basis of combined dividends, combined
taxable income, and combined income tax liabilities.
The Revenue Act of 1964 retained, and even enlarged, the exclusion
(from $50 to $100) but eliminated the credit. The credit was reduced
to 2 percent in 1964 and no credit was allowed for dividends received
after 1964. The reasons for the credit repeal, (as stated in the related
congressional committee reports) were these:
• The notion that the dividend credit would encourage investment
was not borne out by events that had occurred since its enactment in
1954.
• From the standpoint of making funds available for investment in
corporate enterprises, it was felt that the reduction (in 1964) of the
corporate income tax rates, plus the recent enactment of the invest
ment credit, could be expected to have a more im portant im pact than
any reduction directed solely tow ard distributed corporate income.
• The credit reduced any double taxation by a much larger amount
for higher income bracket shareholders than it did for those in the
lower income brackets.
Neither the exclusion nor the credit have ever been allowed with
respect to dividends received from tax-exem pt organizations, foreign
corporations, corporations in business in possessions of the United
States, China Trade A ct corporations, or (for years prior to 1958) in
surance companies. The so-called dividends of mutual savings banks,
cooperative banks, and building and loan associations are also in
eligible.
Corporate Shareholders.
Relief from double taxation has long
been granted to intercorporate dividends. If this were not the case,
such dividends might become subject to taxation any number of times

28

prior to their ultimate distribution to individual shareholders. Under
the 1918, 1921, 1924, 1926, 1928, 1932, and 1934 Revenue Acts, cor
porations were allowed a deduction for 100 percent of dividends re
ceived from most domestic corporations. The 1934 Revenue A ct was
amended in 1935 to reduce the amount of the deduction to 90 percent.
The deduction was changed to a credit in 1936 and continued through
the 1939 code at a rate which was further reduced to 85 percent.
Currently, corporate shareholders are entitled to a deduction of 85
percent of dividends received from most domestic corporations. W here
the dividends are received from other members of “affiliated” groups
( that is, corporations at least 80 percent of whose stock is owned by a
common parent corporation), the allowable deduction is generally
100 percent of such dividends. As in the past, special rules and lim
itations apply to dividends received from certain corporations, such as
tax-exempt corporations and foreign corporations.
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APPENDIX 2

Corporate-Source Income:
A Comparative Summary of Current
Tax Systems in Selected Countries*
Many countries maintain a two-tier system of taxation with respect
to corporate-source income. Corporate net income, or profit, is first
taxed at the corporate level, and any dividends paid to shareholders
are again taxed at graduated individual rates. Such a system gives
rise to full economic double taxation in that little or no relief is granted
at either the corporate or the shareholder levels for the tax imposed on
the other. No effect is accorded the notion that the corporation is
nothing more than the aggregate of its shareholders and thus has no
taxpaying ability beyond that of its shareholders. The corporation is a
distinct, legal, taxpaying entity, separate from its shareholders.
An important exception to the double taxation treatment, however,
is generally accorded to corporate shareholders. Intercorporate divi
dends are exempted, in whole or in part, from the corporate income
tax. If this were not the case, corporate earnings could be taxed two
or more times prior to being taxed at the individual shareholder level.
In contrast to the two-tier, or “unintegrated,” system of taxing cor
porate profits, many countries in recent years have adopted taxing
provisions designed to mitigate the incidence of full economic double
taxation. Such integrated systems have directed the relief in some
cases, to the corporate level by using some sort of “split rate” device
(analogous to the dividends-paid deduction alternative). In other in
stances, by means of a gross-up mechanism, the shareholder level be-

* For a more complete discussion, see Richard M. Hammer, “The Taxation
of Income From Corporate Shareholders: Review of Present Systems in
Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the U.K.,” National Tax Journal,
September, 1975, pp. 315-333.
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comes the focal point of such relief. A few countries eff ec t integration
by directing partial relief to each level.
Under a split-rate system, the tax rate imposed on distributed earn
ings is substantially less than the rate applicable to earnings retained
by the corporation; since it is only the distributed earnings or divi
dends that will be taxed [at graduated rates] to the shareholders upon
receipt. In some countries, this treatm ent is modified by allowing the
corporation a full or partial “dividends-paid” deduction. All, or a
portion of the amount of earnings paid out as dividends is deducted
from the corporation’s net income and the remainder is taxed at stan
dard rates.
The “gross-up” method (sometimes referred to as the “withholding”
or “credit” m ethod) taxes all corporate income at standard rates. The
shareholder generally includes in his gross income the full amount of
the dividend received plus all, or in most cases a portion of, the tax
paid by the corporation on such distributed earnings (th at is, the
grossed-up am ount). The amount of the gross-up is then allowed as a
credit against his personal income tax liability. In theory, where the
corporation and shareholder are residents of the same taxing jurisdic
tion, either a “credit” method or a “split-rate” method could be imple
mented to achieve the same tax results.
The following table briefly summarizes the various systems of
corporate-source income taxation currently employed in Germany,
Japan, Finland, Norway, Canada, Fran ce, the United Kingdom, and
G reece. The scope of this review is limited to the taxation of dividends
paid by a domestic corporation out of non-foreign-source income to its
domestic shareholders.

Germany
Resident corporations are eligible for a reduced tax rate of 15 per
cent on earnings distributed to shareholders. Retained earnings are
taxed at a rate of 51 percent. The earnings used to pay either tax are
treated as retained earnings and are thereby taxed at the 51 percent
rate. Constructive dividends or “hidden distributions” are not eligible
for the split-rate treatment.
The split rate applies equally to dividends paid to individual and
corporate shareholders. Dividends received by individuals are subject
to the graduated personal income tax. Dividends received by another
domestic corporation are taxed as income to that corporation unless—•
• The recipient corporation directly holds at least 2 5 percent of the
share capital of the distributing corporation.
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• The recipient corporation redistributes such dividends to its share
holders in the same year. However, to the extent these dividends are
retained by the corporation, they are taxed at the 51 percent rate.
Year of adoption: 1953.

Japan
Integration is directed toward relief at both the corporate and the
shareholder levels, although the credit system (at the shareholder
level) is of less importance today than in previous years.
A split-rate system applies the following tax rates to corporations
on their net earnings.
Rate on income earRate on
marked for or
retained earnings distributed as dividends

1 . Corporations capitalized
at more than
Y100,000,000 (U.S. $330,000)
2. Corporations capitalized
at less than
Y100,000,000a. Income of more than
Y7,000,000 annually
b. Income of not more than
Y7,000,000 annually

40%

30%

40%

30%

28%

22%

On the individual shareholder level, the full amount of the dividend
(cash received plus the amount of a 15 percent tax on the dividend
withheld at source) is includable in the individual’s gross income.
Gross income is reduced by allowable deductions to arrive at taxable
income against which graduated rates are applied. The 15 percent tax
withheld at source plus a special 10 percent dividend-received credit
are applied against the individual’s gross tax liability. When the tax
payer’s taxable income is greater than ¥10,000,000 (U.S. $33,000), the
amount of the dividend-received credit is reduced, but never below 5
percent of dividends received. Domestic corporate shareholders are
not taxed on dividends received provided their dividend distribution
is equal to the dividends received. If a lesser amount is distributed,
then 25 percent of the diff erence (between the amount of dividends
actually paid and the amount of the minimum distribution required
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to avoid the tax) is included in the corporate shareholder’s income
and taxed as retained earnings.
Year of adoption: 1961.

Finland and Norway
Both countries direct integration relief to the corporate level by
allowing the corporation a deduction for dividends paid.
Finnish law allows a deduction in the amount of 40 percent of cash
dividends declared (1 0 0 percent for dividends declared on newly is
sued stock ), which reduces the corporate tax rate on distributed earn
ings from 43 percent to, at most, 25.8 percent.
Norway permits a 100 percent deduction for dividends paid. Thus,
only retained profits are subjected to the 27 percent corporate tax rate.
Significant local taxes, however, are levied at the same rate upon both
distributed and undistributed income.
In both countries, dividends received are fully taxed to the ultimate
individual shareholder.
Year of adoption: Finland—1965 or earlier; N orway—1970.

Canada
Integration relief is achieved at the shareholder level by means of a
dividend tax credit applied against the individual shareholder’s per
sonal income tax. Intercompany dividends, in most cases, are entirely
exempted from taxation. The corporate income tax rate in C anada is
47 percent (4 6 percent in 1976 and subsequent y ears). Low er rates
are available to small businesses and other corporations with respect
to their net manufacturing and processing income.
The individual taxpayer must include in his gross income four-thirds
of the cash dividend received. He may then claim an amount approxi
mately equal to the gross-up (one-third of the dividend) as a credit
against his individual income tax otherwise due. If the credit results
in an overpayment, a cash refund is available.
Y ear of adoption: 1972.

France
Fran ce achieves integration at the shareholder level by employing
an imputed credit system. Both individual and corporate portfolio
shareholders (th at is, corporations with less than a 10 percent share
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holding) receive a credit against income tax of 50 percent of dividends
received. These shareholders include in their gross incom e the full
amount of dividends received plus 50 percent of that amount (th e
amount of the cred it). The tax liability is reduced by the amount of
the credit. If the credit results in a tax overpayment, an individual
shareholder is entitled to a cash refund. Such a refund is not available
to corporate portfolio shareholders, who lose the benefit of any excess
credit.
The corporate tax rate is 50 percent. Intercom pany dividends, net of
expense incurred by the corporate shareholder in relation to deriving
such income, are exempted from the tax if—
• The corporate shareholder owns at least 10 percent of the issued
shares of the corporation from which the dividends are received.
• The corporate shareholder either subscribed to the shares at the time
of issue or promises to hold them ( or has held th em ) for at least two
years from the time of purchase.
The effect of extending the exemption to “net dividends” rather than
total dividends is to impose a tax of about 4 percent on the total
amount of intercompany dividends received. See R. M. Hammer, cited
in note on page 30, for a derivation of this percentage.
Y ear of adoption: 1965.

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom integrates at the shareholder level. Under this
system, the dividend-paying corporation must make an “advance pay
ment” against its current-year corporate income tax liability in an
amount equal to 49 percent of any dividends it distributes. The indi
vidual shareholder must gross up the dividend by including in his
gross income the full amount of the dividend plus the corporation’s
related advanced payment. He then reduces his tax liability by the
amount of the advanced payment. Cash refunds are available.
Distributions received by domestic corporate shareholders, including
the related advanced paym ent credit of 49 percent, are fully exempted
from the recipient’s corporate tax (5 2 p ercen t). No minimum share
holding in the distributing corporation is required of the recipient
corporation. Furtherm ore, the advance payments m ade by the distrib
uting corporation (w ith respect to the dividends paid to the recipient
shareholder corporation) are used as credits against the amount of ad
vanced payments owed by the recipient corporation.
Y ea r of adoption: 1973.
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Greece
Double taxation is entirely avoided; income from corporate sources
is taxed only once. Distributed dividends are totally exempt from taxa
tion at the corporate level but are taxed in full to shareholders. R e
tained earnings are taxed to the corporation ( at a generally applicable
effective rate of about 38 p ercen t), but the tax is refundable when the
earnings are subsequently distributed.
Y ear of adoption: 1958.
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APPENDIX 3

Comparison of Consequences
Under Various Approaches
The following tables illustrate the mechanics of taxing $300 of cor
porate net earnings under the current U.S. law, and the proposed full
“dividends-paid” deduction method, the “gross-up” method, and the
“half-and-half” method. In each case, it is assumed that the corporation
distributes to its shareholders the full amount of its after-tax earnings.
Neither the $25,000 corporate surtax exemption, nor the $100 exclusion
applicable to the shareholders’ annual dividend income is taken into
account.
Table 1, below, describes the tax consequences of an individual
shareholder in the 30 percent tax bracket, while table 2, page 38, per
tains to such consequences of a 70 percent tax bracket shareholder.
Table 1: 30 Percent Tax Bracket Shareholder

Present Law
Corporate Level
Net Income
(taxable income)
Dividends-paid
Dividend-deduction
Taxable income
Tax (48%)
Retained earnings

Full
Full
Dividend Stockholder
Deduction
Credit

$300
156

$300
300
300

—

300
144
-

—
—

-

Individual Level
Dividend received
$156
—
Gross-up
Taxable income
156
Tax—before credit (30%) 46.80
—
Credit
Tax—after credit
—
Total Tax
Effective rate

$300
—

300
90
—

—

$190.80
63.6%

$ 90
30%
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$300
156

Half-andHalf
Method

300
144
-

$300
205.26
102.63
197.37
94.74
-

$156
144
300
90
144
(5 4 )

$205.26
102.63
307.89
92.37
102.63
(10.26)

$ 90
30%

$ 84.48
28.16%

—

Under the “half-and-half” method, the corporation is entitled to a
deduction for one-half of the dividends paid to its shareholders. The
individual shareholder would gross up his dividend by adding to his
taxable income an amount equal to one-half of the dividends received
and would then take a tax credit equal to the gross-up. The corporate
and individual income taxes in this illustration are computed as
follows:
Corporate level
Dividends-paid
Dividends-paid deduction (50% of $205.26)
Taxable income ($300-$102.63)
X Tax rate
Tax

$205.26
102.63
197.37
X 48%
94.74

Individual Level
Dividends received
Plus: gross-up (50% of $205.26)
Taxable income
X Tax rate

205.26
102.63
307.89
X30%

Tax—before credit
Less: gross-up

92.37
102.63

Tax—after credit

(10.26)

The total tax paid on the
$300 of corporate net earnings is
Thus, the effective rate of tax imposed on
dividend income received by a 30%
tax bracket taxpayer is

84.48

28.16%

As can be seen from this example, the combination of a 50 percent
dividends-paid deduction and a 50 percent gross-up and credit, when
combined with the 48 percent corporate rate, would more than elimi
nate the double tax. One or the other would need to be adjusted
slightly.
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Table 2: 70 Percent Tax Bracket Shareholders

Present Law
Corporate Level
Net income
(Taxable Income)
Dividends-paid
Dividend-deduction
Taxable income
Tax (48%)
Retained earnings

Full
Full
Dividend Stockholder
Credit
Deduction

$300
156

$300
300
300

—

300
144
-

—
—

-

Individual Level
$156
Dividend received
—
Gross-up
Taxable income
156
Tax—before credit (70%) 109.20
—
Credit
Tax—after credit
Total Tax
Effective rate

$300
—

300
210
—

-

$253.20
84.4%

$210
70%
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$300
156

Half-andHalf
Method

300
144
-

$300
205.26
102.63
197.37
94.74
-

$156
144
300
210
144
66

$205.26
102.63
307.89
215.52
102.63
112.89

$210
70%

$207.63
69.21%

—

